We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which household debt is sticky in nominal terms and debtor households are credit constrained. Interest payments on debt contracts may be at floating rates or fixed for the duration of the contract. A key result is that a simple static Taylor Rule can result in a prolonged period in which real interest rates are cut rather than raised in response to an inflationary shock. We show how the proportion of fixed rate contracts affects the monetary transmission mechanism and its implications for the distributional effects of an inflationary shock.
Introduction
Collateralised household debt in EU countries ranges from only 6% of GDP in Greece, up to 65% in the Netherlands and 80% in the United Kingdom, with an average for the EU-15 of 36%. The associated debt contracts are almost always written in nominal terms, have quite signi…cant associated transactions costs and as a consequence are renegotiated relatively infrequently (for example, the UK Council of Mortgage Lenders estimates the average length of a mortgage before re…nancing to be 5 years). In many countries a high proportion of the interest payments on this debt are at a …x e d rate, with the proportion ranging from 80% in France to 30% in the UK down to zero in Portugal. 1 Some of these features of the data have been investigated in the literature. A number of papers have examined "…nancial" models of the business cycle and the role of collateralised debt (for example Bernanke et al., 1999) and some recent papers investigate the role of nominal debt (for example Aoki et al., 2002 , Iacoviello, 2005 ). However the stickiness of debt contracts, and the observation that …x e d rate contracts are common, has still to be addressed. Yet nominal debt stickiness is arguably easier to understand than product price stickiness. A well-known criticism of the standard model of product price stickiness is that the menu costs that ultimately must generate stickiness are unlikely to be large. In the case of debt contracts, in contrast, the costs of adjustment are larger, since typically they will involve re-assessment of collateral or other features of creditworthiness.
In this paper we present a standard new Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model modi…ed in two key respects to re ‡ect the data features noted above. Firstly, to model sticky debt in a tractable manner, we assume that debt contracts adjust in a process very close to the widely used Calvo (1983) model of product prices. This Calvo adjustment process also allows us to model ‡o a t i n g or …x e d interest rates on the debt. Secondly these features of debt contracts matter in our model because some consumers face binding credit constraints. To simplify the analysis, we switch o¤ the …n a n c i a l accelerator channel by assuming that the real value of collateral is …x e d .
We use this model to examine the impact of these features on the response of an economy to an in ‡ationary shock. Since debt is denominated in nominal terms, an in ‡ationary shock changes its real value. The response of monetary policy to this shock changes the interest payment on the debt. The interac-1 Data on stocks of mortgage debt and proportion of …x e d rates from Maclennan et al. (1999) ; data on total UK household debt from Brierley et al. (2002) ; data on the duration of debt from the Council of Mortage Lenders (2004) . Debt renegotiation costs are described in detail for the UK in Miles (2004) tion of these e¤ects, and the response of …n a n c i a l institutions and consumers, determines the behaviour of the economy following the shock.
Our main results are:
1. Since the direct e¤ect of an in ‡ationary shock on nominal interest rates is strongly contractionary, the response of real interest rates necessary to achieve a given contractionary response is initially small or negative in economies where a signi…cant proportion of debt contracts are at ‡o a t i n g rates. Many European countries fall into this category 2. The presence of sluggishly adjusting nominal debt contracts introduces additional, long-lived dynamic responses, as optimising …n a n c i a l institutions bring real debt levels back into line with real collateral, boosting debtors'consumption. As a result real interest rates need ultimately to rise, and stay above steady state for a prolonged period.
3. These new features thus introduce an explanation for a sluggish response of nominal interest rates to in ‡ationary shocks that does not rely on any assumption of interest rate smoothing on the part of the central bank.
4. Fixed rate debt reduces the responsiveness of the economy to monetary policy and shifts the burden of adjustment to a shock onto those with ‡o a t i n g rate debt, as well as unconstrained optimising consumers. It therefore requires a more aggressive response of real interest rates to achieve a given contractionary response to in ‡ation.
Both of the novel features of the model are crucial to these results. If the level of indebtedness, or the nature of debt contracts, is to matter at all for the monetary transmission mechanism, some households must face binding credit constraints. Were this not the case, in ‡ationary shocks would simply cause small distributional wealth e¤ects and the only impact of di¤erent debt systems would then be at most a second-order one due to the di¤ering risk characteristics of di¤erent debt contracts (Campbell and Cocco, 2003) . These would completely net out in the perfect risk-sharing framework that underpins the standard representative agent model. But given our maintained assumption that credit constraints are binding, the nature of debt contracts does matter for the transmission mechanism. 2 We assume that debt is collateralised but that there are costs in measuring collateral, so that contracts only adjust infrequently. This a¤ects the response of the economy in two ways: the response of optimising …n a n c i a l institutions in o¤ering new debt to constrained consumers after an in ‡ationary shock; and the impact of changes in the real value of nominal interest payments on existing debt. The …r s t of these will arise in any system where debt is sticky in nominal terms; the nature of the second e¤ect will depend crucially on whether debt interest payments are made on a ‡o a t i n g or …x e d rate basis.
Some evidence suggestive of a combined role for nominal debt contracts and credit constraints is the well-known and long-standing empirical correlation between consumption and nominal (as opposed to real) interest rates (e.g., Blinder and Deaton, 1985, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) . Fair (2005) cites this as one of the primary reasons why structural macroeconometric models and unrestricted VA R models (Giordani, 2003) imply that in ‡ationary shocks have e¤ects that are contractionary ex ante, rather than expansionary as implied by standard models. Our model helps to provide a theoretical rationale for these features.
There is much evidence that the monetary transmission mechanism di¤ers between countries (for example Angeloni et al., 2003) . Our model implies that institutional features could account for a signi…cant part of these di¤er-ences. Finding direct empirical support for this is complicated by the constant structural change in European mortgage markets over the past 20 years. However Calza et al. (2006) present some preliminary econometric evidence that supports this hypothesis.
In what follows, section 2 presents the model and describes how it is solved and calibrated. Section 3 describes our results, Section 4 discusses implications for monetary policy, and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A shows the linearised system, and Appendix B contains derivations.
The Model
The model is, in most respects, a simple version of the standard dynamic new Keynesian model common in the literature (e.g. Goodfriend and King, 1997) . Households consume …n a l goods, supply labour and hold …n a n c i a l assets. Intermediate-goods …r m s produce di¤erentiated goods which are imperfect substitutes in the production function of …n a l -g o o d s …r m s . Calvo pricing on the part of intermediate-goods …r m s gives rise to a new Keynesian Phillips curve. A monetary authority sets the real interest rate as in Clarida et al. (1999) .
The non-standard features are the presence of credit-constrained households, and of …n a n c i a l institutions who lend to these households by means of sticky nominal debt contracts.
Note that upper case letters refer to levels, lower case to their log-linearised deviations from non-stochastic steady state values. Symbols without time subscripts refer to steady-state values. Full derivations can be found in Appendix B.
Households
Households consume, supply labour, lend or borrow and are endowed with a single physical asset whose real value is exogenously given. All households have in…nite horizons and rational expectations. Following Iacoviello (2005) , we divide households up into two types: type 1 having a higher discount factor than type 2, 1 > 2 . A household of type j maximises its utility given by:
where the instantaneous utility function is
where c and n are the elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption and of leisure. We follow the growing convention in the literature of building a monetary model without money (see McCallum, 2001 ). The maximisation is subject to the real budget constraint
where C jt is consumption, Y jt = W jt N jt + T jt is after-tax labour income (W jt is the real wage, N jt labour supplied and T jt a transfer from government), A jt the household's stock of …n a n c i a l assets at the start of period t. Div jt+1 are dividends paid by intermediate …r m s and …n a n c i a l institutions. t+1 = P t+1 =P t 1 is the rate of in ‡ation between periods t and t + 1, and R jt the 3 This can be derived from an asset evolution equation in nominal terms
nominal interest rate, set in period t; and payable in period t + 1; given by
where R t is the short-term interest rate set by the central bank, R D t is the rate payable on borrowings which we consider in detail later. While …n a n c i a l assets pay an interest rate that is "safe" in nominal terms since it is set in period t; the real return is uncertain due to in ‡ation.
Households face a further constraint
where D t is the level of debt which …n a n c i a l institutions are prepared to lend to households (the process determining this level of debt is described in Section 2.2). Given the di¤erence in subjective discount factors, the existence of a credit constraint in some form is a necessary condition for the existence of a nonstochastic steady state in which type 2s have non-zero consumption. To see this, note that the Euler equation for a household of type j is
where jt is the Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint. In the steady state we assume below that R 1 = R 2 = R due to competition in credit markets, and if consumption is non-zero for both types of household, (7) becomes
which, given 1 > 2 cannot hold for both types if credit constraints bind for neither type, since this would imply both 1 and 2 are zero. 4 However a steady state can exist in which type 1s hold positive assets, so that (6) cannot bind and 1 = 0: This implies R = 1= 1 1 and hence 2 = 1 2 1 > 0, so credit constraints must bind for type 2s in steady state. We assume that deviations from steady state are su¢ ciently small that credit constraints bind for type 2s in all time periods, and never bind for type 1s.
Thus for type 1 (unconstrained) consumers, setting 1t = 0; equation (7) can be linearised in standard fashion:
while the binding credit constraint means that type 2 (constrained) households are at a corner solution and are not full optimisers. Their consumption is then given by the budget constraint (3). Linearising (3) gives:
where
is the steady-state debt to consumption ratio of type 2 households. The sum of the …r s t two terms on the right-hand side is linearised disposable income after interest payments. The third term represents the change in nominal debt over the period: if banks o¤er new debt constrained households accept it to fund consumption. The fourth term is the change in interest payments due to debt deviating from its steady state value.
Although there is some evidence to support it (for example Lawrance, 1991) , the assumption of di¤ering discount rates is principally a device to motivate credit constraints. Another way of thinking about credit constraints is within a life cycle model of consumption. For some households the optimal level of consumption, out of current …n a n c i a l wealth and future lifetime earnings, would imply a current level of debt greater than that which a …n a ncial institution would be prepared to lend, given that household's collateral. This might apply, for example, for households relatively early in the life cycle, for whom future labour income (that cannot be collateralised) makes up a signi…cant fraction of total wealth.
Each type of household supplies a di¤erent type of labour. The linearised …r s t -o r d e r conditions for labour supply are standard:
Financial institutions
Financial institutions make loans to households. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) we assume that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless they are secured. The optimal value of debt is then given by some constant fraction (which we normalise to unity) of households'collateral K; which we assume constant across time and across households. 5 A …n a n c i a l institution faces costs in deviating from this level. If it lends more than this level, part of the debt is unsecured and there is default risk on this unsecured portion. If it lends less, the cost arises from foregone pro…t opportunities.
Debt contracts are sticky in nominal terms. To capture this stickiness in a tractable way, we progress by analogy to Calvo's model of the aggregate price level. We assume a constant probability that any given debt contract will be adjusted in the next period, with complete adjustment towards its optimal value if adjustment does take place. 6 This simple model implicitly assumes that banks face costs, analogous to the "menu costs" discussed in the price adjustment literature, in measuring the creditworthiness of individuals. As a result, households only re-mortgage infrequently.
When deciding the nominal value of a new contract Z t+1 at time t the …n a n c i a l institution's problem is
where t;t+i is the stochastic discount factor of the owners of the …n a n c i a l intermediaries (the unconstrained households):
and …n a n c i a l institutions charge a rate R z t on a new contract, and raise ‡o a t i n grate funds from unconstrained households at the central bank's target rate. t is a cost, assumed to be quadratic, of deviating from the optimal value of debt
where $ is a scaling parameter. Since all households have identical collateral this aggregate cost will simply be a scaling of the cost of debt deviating from collateral for any individual household. Deriving the …r s t -o r d e r condition, then linearising gives
where F is the forward shift-operator (F i x t = x t+i ) and B (F ) = 1 1 (1 ) F . This condition gives the expected value of a new real debt contract at time t+1 in terms of the expected path of in ‡ation. Note that the scaling parameter in (14), $, has no impact on the dynamics of the system. If $ increases, a …n a n c i a l institution's costs and marginal cost increase in the same proportion, but the zero pro…t condition for …n a n c i a l institutions implies that revenue and hence marginal revenue do too. So $ cancels out of the equilibrium condition.
Aggregate debt
At time t a proportion (1 ) i of …n a n c i a l institutions have reset their contracts i periods earlier and have not had the opportunity to reset them since. So we can sum over all contracts and all …n a n c i a l institutions to obtain the real value of aggregate debt:
Linearising this gives an expression for the evolution of the nominal value of aggregate debt in terms of the value of individual debt contracts:
Floating and …x e d rates
The interest rate payable on debt can be either ‡o a t i n g or …x e d . We do not attempt to model households' decision on whether to hold …x e d or ‡o a t i n g rate debt, though we will have something to say about the factors in ‡uencing the decision. On ‡o a t i n g rate contracts …n a n c i a l institutions charge the nominal interest rate plus a constant spread, which has no impact on the linearised dynamics, so we set it to zero. For …x e d rate debt, …n a n c i a l institutions choose the (fairly priced) …x e d rate on a particular debt contract, R z t , according to a no-arbitrage condition:
which when linearised gives
The average …x e d rate R F t payable on …x e d rate debt will then be
Linearising gives r
If there is some proportion of borrowers in …x e d schemes the average rate payable on aggregate debt will be
where we linearise around a steady state where R is constant so R D = R.
Ownership of …n a n c i a l institutions
Financial intermediaries are owned by unconstrained households. Since these households have access to complete markets any idiosyncratic risk arising from the resetting of the Calvo contracts will be eliminated at the level of the representative household. Competition among …n a n c i a l intermediaries drives expected pro…ts over the life of the contract to zero so, if all debt is ‡o a t i n g rate, …n a n c i a l institutions will never earn pro…ts. With some …x e d rate debt, pro…ts will be earned on …x e d rate contracts after unexpected shocks. This pro…t is remitted in full to unconstrained households.
Firms
In standard fashion we model two types of …r m s . Intermediate-goods …r m s with market power produce Dixit-Stiglitz di¤erentiated goods that are inputs to the production process of …n a l -g o o d s …r m s who costlessly aggregate them to produce a single consumption good.
Intermediate-goods …r m s produce di¤erentiated goods by means of a technology in which the labour of the two types of households are imperfect substitutes. The cost minimisation problem is then:
subject to the production function
( 24) giving …r s t -o r d e r conditions
where MC t is real marginal cost. The output of intermediate-goods …r m s are imperfect substitutes in the production function of …n a l goods …r m s which produce a single homogenous consumption good using no other factors of production.
Calvo pricing by intermediate-goods …r m s allows us to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve as the solution to an intertemporal pro…t maximisation problem. But it is well known that the New Keynesian Phillips curve cannot of itself generate observable degrees of in ‡ation persistence, which (acting via the nominal interest rate) plays an important role in our results. To generate in ‡ation persistence we follow Clarida et al. (1999) by adding ad hoc a term in lagged in ‡ation to obtain
where the parameter captures the stickiness of in ‡ation, , a function of the underlying parameters, measures the sensitivity of in ‡ation to deviations in real marginal cost mc t and u t is a white noise "cost-push" shock. 8 This particular form form for the Phillips Curve is not crucial to our results, but our speci…cation has the attractive feature as discussed in Clarida et al. (1999) , that in reduced form in ‡ation persistence is endogenous to monetary policy. 9 Firms, like …n a n c i a l institutions, are owned by unconstrained households. To simplify the model, we assume the existence of a government whose only role is to tax away monopoly pro…ts and remit the proceeds to households lump sum in proportion to their (constant) shares of labour income. Given the Cobb-Douglas technology this has the convenient property that the e¤ective shares of each type in total income are constant and equal to their respective labour shares. We discuss the impact of relaxing this assumption, and allowing pro…ts to ‡o w directly to the …r m s ' ow n e r s in Section 4.3.
Monetary policy
We characterise monetary policy by a simple rule for output
Under standard assumptions, <0 and the central bank leans against the wind, choosing its policy instrument to contract demand when in ‡ation is above target. The transmission mechanism of the economy then gives a rule for the policy instrument, in this case the real interest rate, of the form:
where (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator. In the standard model (as in e.g. Clarida et al., 1999 ) the transmission mechanism is the economy's optimising IS curve and (L) is a constant, so that there is a direct equivalence between a static output rule and a static real interest rate rule. This in turn can be reparameterised as a Taylor Rule for the nominal interest rate under other reasonable assumptions. 10 In our model, the nature of debt contracts determines the transmission mechanism and hence (L) implies additional long-lived dynamics in both real and nominal interest rates. In the short run however, with appropriate calibration of , the resulting looking component from an optimising framework with higher order lag polynomial adjustment costs of changing prices.
9 Exogenous in ‡ation persistence could also be introduced straightforwardly with a standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve by setting = 0 but allowing u t to be serially correlated, without signi…cant changes to our results. 10 Clarida et al. (1999) show that demand shocks and in ‡ation persistence can be incorporated straightforwardly into this framework. rule for nominal rates very closely resembles the static Taylor Rule.
Our results are not signi…cantly altered if we allow monetary policy to follow a Taylor Rule directly (see section 4.1); but our approach has the advantage of allowing us to focus on distributional consequences of in ‡ationary shocks by making outcomes for output and hence aggregate consumption invariant to the transmission mechanism.
Identities
Total output is given by
and incomes of both types of household exhaust total output so
While the economy also includes a central bank and …r m s the model implies that they have zero net …n a n c i a l assets in each period. We can combine (31) with the budget constraints for both types of households (3) and the binding credit constraint (6) to give
The assets of type 1 households will thus equal the liabilities of type 2 households at all times.
Solution method and calibration
The system of linearised equations describing the economy is shown in Appendix A. We solve this system by the method set out in McCallum (1998) . We calibrate our model on quarterly data with the values shown in table 1 which correspond to those for the UK economy. With the exception of the monetary policy parameter ; and ; the proportion of …x e d rate contracts, the qualitative nature of our results is insensitive to a wide degree of variation in the assumed parameters.
There is considerable uncertainty as to the quantitative signi…cance of credit constraints: Campbell and Mankiw (1991) …n d the consumption share of credit constrained consumers to be between 0.2 and 0.65. For simplicity we assume equal labour income shares of one half for both types of consumer. Along with other assumptions on debt and steady state interest rates, this in turn implies that the consumption share of constrained consumers is just under one half.
11 Brierley et al. (2002) , using data from the British Household Panel Survey, give debt to annual income ratios ranging from 4 among the lowest income households to 1 among the highest. We take , the steady state debt to quarterly consumption ratio of type 2 households, to be 8. 12 We assume that the expected life of debt contracts is given by the average frequency with which individuals re-mortgage. For the debt reset probability, , we choose 0.05 implying the expected life of a debt contract is 1 0:05 = 20 quarters or 5 years. This is shorter than the notional maturity of most mortgage debt, but re ‡ects the fact that such debt is generally renegotiated on a number of occasions before maturity, most notably on moving house.
We describe monetary policy by an output rule rather than a Taylor rule to make outcomes for output (and aggregate consumption) invariant to the transmission mechanism so allowing us to focus on distributional consequences. To calibrate , the measure of how strongly monetary policy responds to in ‡ation, we …r s t choose the proportion of …x e d rate contracts to match that found in the UK ( =0:3). Then, given this transmission mechanism, we choose to give the same impact response of the nominal interest rate as would be implied by a simple Taylor rule of the form r t = 1:5 t + :5y t (in section 4.1 we brie ‡y discuss the e¤ect of directly implementing a Taylor Rule). We choose , the coe¢ cient on lagged in ‡ation in the Phillips curve, to give a realistic degree of in ‡ation persistence given the other parameters.
As to the preferences of the households, the discount rate of unconstrained households 1 is chosen to give an annual real interest rate of approximately 4%. For 2 we follow Iacoviello (2005) in choosing a value of 0.95. We set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, c to 1 2 and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labour, n to 2. We choose steady state labour supply to match observed hours as in King and Rebelo (1999) .
11 Given the production function and the impact of the lump-sum tax, the consumption share of unconstrained consumers is given by = + R 1+R (1 ) : On our calibration = 0:537 12 This matches well with UK aggregate data. In 2000 total annual consumption (ABPB) in billions of GBP was 594.8 (blue book table 6.2). Financial Statistics Table 3 .1G gives total M4 debt for the household sector (sum of lending on property (AVHG), consumer debt (95.1) and lending to unincorporated businesses (AVHI) as 481:8 + 95:1 + 34 = 610:9 while total M4 deposits of the personal sector (VSCL) were very similar at 585.6 (ie the household sector is a modest net debtor). Thus annual consumption is very close to total debt, which with a consumption share of constrained consumer of just under one half con…rms our choice of = 8 
Results
In this section we analyze the response to a unit "cost push" shock to the Phillips curve (27) of four model economies: two where all debt is either ‡o a t i n g or …x e d , and two mixed cases. While we consider the …r s t two cases principally for heuristic purposes, data reported in Maclennan et al. (2000) suggests the purely ‡o a t i n g case corresponds closely to Portugal and Finland.
In our mixed cases, we consider two economies, one with a relatively low (30%) share of …x e d rate debt, which corresponds roughly to the case of the UK, the other with a relatively high (80%) share corresponding roughly to France. To focus on the distributional consequences of changing the transmission mechanism, we hold all other parameters constant across cases. In particular, the speci…cation of monetary policy is held constant across these cases so that the response of output (and hence, from (30), aggregate consumption) is the same in all cases: a 1.76% reduction on impact (since = 1:76) then a gradually rise back to the steady state as in ‡ation decays.
The dynamics of debt are independent of the proportion of …x e d rate debt, and the dynamics of in ‡ation largely so. Before turning to our individual model economies we discuss the processes for debt and in ‡ation that underlie all of them.
The dynamics of in ‡ation and debt
Inspection of the Phillips curve (27) shows there are potentially two sources for dynamics in in ‡ation: endogenous dynamics given by the parameter and the dynamics of marginal cost.
To illustrated, consider a simpli…ed version of the model in which the steady state real interest rate is zero. With this assumption, and given our baseline calibration, marginal cost is proportional to output, in deviations mc t = 1 c + # y t so the Phillips curve can be rewritten as
Then using the policy rule (28) it is straightforward to show that in this special case in ‡ation follows a …r s t -o r d e r autoregressive process.
where " t is a scaling of the "cost-push" shock, u t , and @ @ > 0: the less monetary policy leans against the wind, the more persistent will be in ‡ation (as in Clarida et al., 1999) .
When in ‡ation follows this autoregressive process, the process for the value of a new debt contract (15) can be rearranged to give
where the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation is increasing in . If in ‡ation is above its steady state value, the more persistent is in ‡ation, the higher the real value of the contract chosen by …n a n c i a l institutions when they reset the contract's value in nominal terms since the faster it will be eroded. In the actual model, without the simplifying assumption of a zero steady state real interest rate, extra dynamics are introduced into the system due to the dynamics of consumption a¤ecting those of marginal cost. However these e¤ects are small (since the steady state real interest rate is small) and the process for in ‡ation remains very close to AR(1) in all our calibrations. As a result an (appropriately calibrated) output rule is always close to a static Taylor Rule. Figure 1 shows the response of real debt to a unit in ‡ationary shock. On impact, real debt falls, continues to fall for 5 quarters, then slowly rises back to its steady state value. This path is the consequence of the interaction of two e¤ects. If the nominal value of debt were constant ( = 0), the real value of debt would mirror the price level, jumping down by 1% on impact, then falling gradually to a permanently lower long-run value (in the AR(1) case this would be 1 1 % below its initial value). This is shown by the dotted line in …g u r e 1. But …n a n c i a l institutions reset the nominal value of debt according to the Calvo process described above, which ultimately brings the real value of debt back to its steady state value. As can be seen from …g u r e 1, on impact the 1% in ‡ationary shock causes a 1% fall in the real value of debt since nominal debt is set one period in advance. At …r s t , the in ‡ationary shock's erosion of the real value of debt dominates the debt adjustment process and real debt initially falls. As the in ‡ationary shock decays, the debt adjustment process dominates and the real value of debt gradually returns to its steady state. 9  12  15  18  21  24  27  30  33  36  39  42  45  48  51  54  57  60  63  66  69  72  75  78 Inflation real debt with adjustment real debt, no adjustment From (32) the assets of unconstrained consumers always equal the debt of constrained consumers. Given that the real value of debt returns to its steady state after a shock (which it must do since real collateral is …x e d ) the real value of assets must do so too so there are no long run e¤ects. Figure 2 shows the response to an in ‡ationary shock of an economy in which all debt is ‡o a t i n g rate ( =0). The burden of adjustment to the in ‡ationary shock falls largely on constrained consumers (indeed on impact almost entirely 13 Quarters after the shock on the x-axis, deviations from steady state values on the y-axis. Note the x-axis here is longer than in subsequent …g u r e s . so). But the fall in aggregate consumption (in this simple economy identical to the fall in output) is brought about despite an initial fall in real interest rates that is not reversed for nearly two years. To understand the features of the economy that lead to these responses it is useful to start by considering constrained consumption. The consumption of constrained consumers is given by their linearised budget constraint (10) which, since the steady state interest rate is small compared to , can be written approximately as:
Floating rate debt
where the second line follows from our calibration and the log linearisation of (30), which implies that y 2t = y t = c 1t +(1 )c 2t , where is the steady-state share of unconstrained consumption. So there are three e¤ects that determine the path of constrained consumption 1. The output response. Since the central bank sets the real interest rate to achieve a fall in y t ; this reduces constrained consumption in all periods.
2. The response of the debtor rate, r D t . With all ‡o a t i n g rate debt, the rate paid on nominal debt is (in deviations) equal to the nominal interest rate, which is above its steady state value in all periods after an in ‡ationary shock even when the real rate is below steady state. So this reduces constrained consumption in all periods.
3. The change in nominal debt between periods t and t+1 (given by d t+1 + t+1 ). The behaviour of …n a n c i a l institutions means that in the period after the in ‡ationary shock and thereafter, they issue new nominal debt to households to bring the real value of debt back in line with collateral. Since constrained households immediately consume the additional real resources from this new debt, this increases their consumption in all periods.
In the simplest possible case, if constrained consumers had no debt ( = 0); only the …r s t e¤ect would operate, and their consumption would simply track the output response and hence (from the second line of (37)) that of unconstrained optimising consumers. Since these in turn respond only to real interest rates the economy would in this restricted case have the standard feature that a negative output response to in ‡ation would require a positive response of real interest rates.
With non-zero debt ( >0) the response of constrained consumption will di¤er from that of unconstrained consumption and output, the sign of the di¤erence depending on the relative magnitudes of e¤ect (2) and e¤ect (3), on whether the nominal interest rate rises by more than the rate of increase of nominal debt. While most of the impact of the shock on nominal interest rates decays with in ‡ation the adjustment of real debt is much more prolonged. As a result, as can be seen from the impulse response functions in Figure 2 , in the pure ‡o a t i n g rate case initially e¤ect (2) dominates; but as the nominal interest rate falls back, e¤ect (3) increasingly dominates, with constrained consumption rising above its steady state after nearly two years before gradually falling back towards it.
This longer-term positive response to an in ‡ationary shock is not a conventional wealth e¤ect due to the fall in the real value of debt shown in Figure 1 , since constrained consumers are not intertemporal optimisers. The response is instead driven by the optimising response of …n a n c i a l institutions. The fall in the real value of debt causes them losses in the short term, that they simply pass on to their owners, the unconstrained consumers. Then they optimise by increased lending to bring the real value of debt gradually back in line with collateral. Constrained consumers respond by simply spending these additional funds.
Given the time pro…le of the response of constrained consumers, the resource constraint implies that unconstrained consumption must respond on impact by less than constrained consumption (indeed it barely falls at all), but, with the real interest rate subsequently rising above steady state, unconstrained consumption falls, and stays below its steady state for long after the impact on in ‡ation itself has disappeared. However, the overall burden of adjustment borne by unconstrained consumers is unambiguously reduced, compared to the cases where there were no credit constraints or constrained consumers had no debt.
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The pattern of falling, then rising real interest rates is consistent with the …n d i n g (Clarida et al., 1998 , among others) that, except in relatively recent years, the historic response of real interest rates to in ‡ation in some countries has been close to zero or even negative. Rather than such behaviour being due either to interest rate smoothing, or breaches of the Taylor Principle, our model suggests that an initial fall in real interest rates may easily arise in economies in which a signi…cant proportion of households are credit constrained and hold ‡o a t i n g rate debt. 16 We discuss this issue further below, in Section 4.2. Figure 3 shows the response of the economy to an in ‡ationary shock in an economy with only …x e d rate debt ( =1). While the aggregate output response is (by construction) identical to the case with all ‡o a t i n g rate debt, the distributional e¤ects on impact are almost precisely reversed. In this case constrained consumption barely falls, so that the impact e¤ect of the fall in output is almost entirely borne by unconstrained consumers. To understand this response, again consider the three determinants of constrained consumption described above. E¤ects (1) and (3) are close to identical to the ‡o a t i n g rate case since the output response and debt responses are determined only by the process for in ‡ation which (for reasons discussed in section 3.1) is barely a¤ected by the transmission mechanism. However e¤ect (2) is very di¤erent. Now the rate on debt is equal to the …x e d rate r (21) which is very insensitive to changes in nominal rates 18 . This means that e¤ect (2) is dominated by e¤ect (3) in all periods after the shock, so that constrained consumption falls by much less than unconstrained consumption and output on impact, and responds positively after only two quarters. As in the previous case there is a prolonged positive response as …n a n c i a l institutions restore real debt levels in line with collateral. 17 Quarters after the shock on the x-axis, deviations from steady state values on the y-axis. 18 It is doubly insensitive because the average …x e d rate is a backward moving average of the …x e d rate on any given contract, which is itself a forward moving average of short rates.
Fixed rate debt
To achieve a given response of output to in ‡ation, the resource constraint means that unconstrained consumption must follow a steeply rising path, requiring a large impact response of real interest rates. 
Two mixed cases
Figures 4 and 5 show the responses of the economy to an in ‡ationary shock in two economies in which there is both ‡o a t i n g and …x e d rate debt. Figure 4 shows responses with a relatively low proportion of …x e d rate debt ( =0:3, roughly corresponding to the UK); Figure 5 when the proportion is relatively high ( =0:8; roughly corresponding to France). Now households can be divided into three types: unconstrained households; constrained households with ‡o a t i n g rate debt; and constrained households with …x e d rate debt. Since the aggregate consumption response is identical in both cases, and the in ‡ation response almost so these are not shown in Figures 4 and 5 .
Since the aggregate output and debt responses are again determined by the path for in ‡ation, and the interest rate on …x e d rate contracts is very unresponsive to short-term interest rates, the consumption response of consumers with …x e d rate contracts in both mixed cases is virtually identical to the case in which all contracts were assumed to be …x e d . The big di¤erences between the two cases therefore arise from the responses of constrained consumers with ‡o a t i n g rate contracts, and unconstrained consumers.
With a relatively low share of …x e d rate contracts, as in the "UK" case, Figure 4 shows that the overall response of constrained vs. unconstrained consumers is quite similar to that in the pure ‡o a t i n g rate case. As a result this case displays the same pattern of an initial fall in the real interest rate that is only reversed after 5 quarters. The only di¤erence is that, with 30% of constrained consumers largely insulated from the impact of the shock, both constrained consumers on ‡o a t i n g rate contracts and unconstrained consumers have to bear a larger burden of the aggregate adjustment. 19 Note that in this case, for a given output response, and hence a given in ‡ation and debt response, the approximation in (37) implies that the relative burden of adjustment on constrained and unconstrained consumers is almost precisely pinned down by ; the ratio of debt to constrained consumption. An increase in, for example, c ; will raise the responsiveness of unconstrained consumers to real interest rates. But this will translate almost wholly into lesser rises in real rates in order to achieve a given output response. It will have no other impact on the economy since constrained consumers are almost entirely insulated from the impact of interest rates given the sluggish response of rates on …x e d contracts. This latter feature is greatly accentuated in the "French" case shown in Figure 5 , in which 80% of constrained consumers are on …x e d rate contracts. As a result the burden of adjustment has to fall on the remaining small proportion of constrained consumers on ‡o a t i n g rate contracts, and on unconstrained consumers. This in turn requires a distinctly more aggressive response of monetary policy in terms of real interest rates. For ‡o a t i n g rate consumers the impact of this response on nominal rates implies over twice as large a fall in their consumption as when all debt contracts are at ‡o a t i n g rates. This suggests the presence of a network externality e¤ect: as more households join …x e d mortgage schemes, so the insurance bene…t of a …x e d rate scheme increases, in comparison to ‡o a t i n g rate schemes. The rise in real interest rates required to satisfy the output rule (28) becomes larger, and as a result more of the burden of adjustment is passed on to constrained consumers with ‡o a t i n g rate debt. Other things being equal, it might be expected that the existence of such a strong network externality e¤ect would drive ‡o a t i n g rate debt out of existence. The fact that we do not observe markets in which …x e d rates are completely dominant therefore requires other things to be happening. The most obvious explanation is the existence of a term premium which raises the cost of …x e d rate mortgages.
Monetary policy 4.1 Tayl or Rules vs. Output Rules
We have modelled monetary policy as an output rule so that aggregate e¤ects are held constant as we varied the transmission mechanism in the above sections. How would the results discussed above vary if we modelled monetary policy directly as a Taylor Rule rather than by our assumed output rule? We noted in section 3.1 that the dynamics of in ‡ation and output mean that the output rule we assume is very close to mimicking the impact of a simple static Taylor Rule. But we also showed that as the proportion of …x e d rate contracts rose real interest rates needed to respond more aggressively to the in ‡ationary shock in order to achieve a given fall in output. By implication, if instead we held the Taylor Rule coe¢ cients constant the impact on output would be reduced, and hence there would be less of a stabilising impact of monetary policy. The e¤ects are non-trivial: the implied output response on impact in the case of 80% …x e d rate debt with …x e d Taylor Rule coe¢ cients would be only just over half that in the case of 30% …x e d rate debt.
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This implies that a monetary authority in a country with a high proportion of ‡o a t i n g rate debt (e.g. the UK) should be able to adopt a less aggressive monetary policy in terms of real interest rates than one with a high proportion of …x e d rate debt (e.g. the US). However, empirical estimates for Taylor rule coe¢ cients for recent years are roughly the same in these two countries. Our model suggests therefore that the Bank of England is more averse to in ‡ation than the Fed. This in ‡ation aversion has signi…cant distributional consequences, with much of the burden of in ‡ation stabilisation borne by constrained households with ‡o a t i n g rate debt.
Interest rate smoothing
Empirical estimates of Taylor rules, for example Clarida et al. (1998) , typically …n d a large coe¢ cient on the lagged nominal interest rate, with gradual adjustment towards a target real interest rate. A number of explanations of such "interest rate smoothing" can be found in the literature (Woodford, 2003 , is one example). With this feature monetary policy may satisfy the Taylor Principle (Woodford, 2001 ) that real rates should ultimately rise in response to a notional permanent rise in the in ‡ation rate 22 (i.e. in terms of our equation (29) (1) > 0), even if real rates fall in the short-term (i.e. (0) < 0).
Our results show that this feature can arise without any assumption of interest rate smoothing, solely due to the presence of sticky nominal debt contracts, as long as the share of ‡o a t i n g rate contracts is su¢ ciently high. Notably however the "long-run Taylor Principle" that (1) > 0 still applies, albeit with quite long lags. Gali et al. (2003) show that the presence of credit constrained consumers (who, unlike in our model, are assumed to have no …n a n c i a l assets or liabilities at all) can quite signi…cantly alter the usual conditions for stability and uniqueness which are otherwise automatically satis…ed by the Taylor Rule. This feature arises because in their model, as in ours, the real wage is procyclical due to price stickiness and constrained consumption is driven by the process for labour income. Without debt, and without the assumed role for government in redistributing pro…ts, a very similar feature arises in our model when monetary policy is implemented as a Taylor Rule. However, with the redistribution of pro…ts these e¤ects disappear since shares of both types of consumer in total factor incomes are constant. While the issue of factor income shares is potentially of some importance (and has been largely neglected in recent research since it only arises when there are credit constraints) it is also quite sensitive to other assumptions in the model (for example Fair, 2005 , notes that with wage rather than price stickiness real wages are counter-cyclical), so we prefer to base our results on the simpler case of constant factor shares.
Fact or shares, stability and uniqueness
An analytical advantage of assuming an output rule rather than Taylor Rule representation of monetary policy is that a su¢ cient condition for a unique stable solution is that ; the parameter in (28) be less than or equal to zero: i.e., that monetary policy "lean against the wind"in terms of output, in response to in ‡ationary shocks. This condition is invariant to the share of credit-constrained consumers as long as we have the redistribution mechanism via taxation such that shares of total factor incomes are constant. Clarida et al. (1999) note that cost-push shocks lead to a trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilisation, and that this trade-o¤ is worsened as the persistence of in ‡ation increases. In our model, persistence in in ‡ation arises from the backward looking term in the Phillips curve and the dynamics of marginal cost. We show in Appendix B that marginal cost is given by
Policy frontiers
As, , the proportion of …x e d rate debt, increases, more of the burden of adjustment falls on unconstrained consumers and less on constrained so c 2t c 1t increases in every period. This increases marginal cost in every period and, through the Phillips curve, makes in ‡ation more persistent.
To understand the nature of the trade-o¤ note …r s t l y that for a given level of …x e d rate debt, , if the monetary authority becomes more averse to in ‡ation ( becomes more negative) the persistence of in ‡ation is decreased and secondly that the relation between output volatility and in ‡ation volatility can be derived from the output rule (28)
Then consider a particular level of output volatility. As increases this tends to make in ‡ation, and hence output more persistent, so to achieve a given level of output volatility must become less negative. But becoming less negative means from (39) that a higher level of in ‡ation volatility corresponds to each level of output volatility so the trade-o¤ worsens. Figure 6 shows how the policy frontiers vary with in the case of an innovation to the Phillips curve with unit standard deviation. As increases the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation volatility and output volatility worsens. For example, in our baseline calibration with all ‡o a t i n g rates and = 1:76 the monetary authority achieves output volatility of 1.7 and in ‡ation volatility of 0.97. With all …x e d rates, the level of in ‡ation volatility corresponding to this level of output volatility rises to 1.1%, and the policy parameter necessary to achieve it rises to = 1:58. If the central bank is less averse to in ‡ation, in ‡ation is more persistent and the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of …x e d rate debt becomes bigger. With = 1:0 and all ‡o a t i n g rates the central bank achieves output and in ‡ation volatility of 1.31 (the same by (39)). To achieve the same level of output volatility in the all …x e d rate cases requires = 0:75 and a volatility of in ‡ation of 1.75.
Conclusions
We started this paper with three observations about the data:
(a) Household debt is written in nominal terms (b) Adjustments to such debt are costly (c) In many countries a large proportion of interest payments on such debt are at a …x e d rate.
In the light of these features of the data we construct a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which sticky nominal debt contracts play an important role. We use this model to analyze how di¤erent debt contracts a¤ect the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that a simple static Taylor Rule can easily result in a prolonged period in which real interest rates are cut rather than raised in response to an in ‡ationary shock.
Our analysis of a mixed case consisting of households having both …x e d and ‡o a t i n g rate debt suggests that the cost of adjustment to an in ‡ationary shock is shared very unequally between di¤erent types of households, the highest cost being paid by constrained households with ‡o a t i n g rate debt. This implies that were a country with predominately ‡o a t i n g rate debt (the UK) to join a monetary union consisting of countries with a higher proportion of …x e d rate debt (France, Germany, Italy), other things being equal, it would subsequently bear a large proportion of the cost of adjustment to in ‡ationary shocks. It would seem policy is anticipating this potential cost of monetary union, the commissioning of Miles (2004) being one example.
Although we have, following convention, focussed on a positive in ‡ationary shock, the more relevant case in the recent past would arguably be a negative, or disin ‡ationary shock. Our linearised model is of course symmetric, implying that a temporary fall in in ‡ation (or, prospectively, a period of de‡a t i o n ) should boost debtor consumption in a system like the UK where debt is predominantly at ‡o a t i n g rates. In the case of de ‡ation this also requires that the value of new debt contracts should fall, if …n a n c i a l institutions are to bring real debt into line with collateral, raising the prospect of some degree of asymmetry if cuts in debt cannot be enforced on recontracting.
The model we have presented is of course highly stylised. To simplify our analysis we chose to switch o¤ the …n a n c i a l accelerator mechanism by assuming collateral is …x e d . Endogenising house prices with a model such as that in Aoki et al. (2002) would allow us to relax this assumption. We chose the Calvo style model of debt contracts for its tractability, but, as with the Calvo model of product prices, this is its principal merit. To draw quantitative policy implications from the model it would be necessary to embed it in a more sophisticated framework, with multiple shocks, so that the importance of the role of debt contracts channel could be compared with that of other parts of the transmission mechanism.
A The linearised model
The linearised economy is given by a set of 15 equations in 15 unknowns, y t ,
z ,n 1t ; n 2t ; w 1t ; w 2t ; mc t Aggregate demand The Euler equation for unconstrained consumers:
The debt evolution equation for constrained consumers
where we exploit the fact that the redistributive nature of the tax on pro…ts and lump-sum transfers results in type 2 factor income being in constant proportion to total income, hence y 2t = y t :
The resource constraint (30) becomes
Aggregate supply
The Phillips curve with a term in lagged in ‡ation to generate in ‡ation persistence
Labour supply curves for type 1 and type 2 households, from (11)
Labour demand for the two types of labour from (25) and (26) w 1t = mc t + y t n 1t (46)
and combining these with the linearised production function gives an expres-sion for the …r m 's marginal cost
Financial institutions
The optimal nominal value of a new debt contract arising from the optimising behaviour of …n a n c i a l institutions
a process for aggregate debt
the optimal rate on a new contract
the average rate on a …x e d rate contract
the average rate on all debt
Monetary policy
The monetary policy rule is
A conventional "dynamic IS-LM" model (such as that presented in McCallum, 2001 ) comprises four equations: a forward-looking IS curve, a Phillips curve, a rule for monetary policy and a resource constraint. Equations (40) to (54) of our model correspond to this, though to enable us to focus on the distributional e¤ects of in ‡ationary shocks we replace McCallum's Taylor rule with an output rule. We add three features to the model. Firstly, the presence of credit constrained consumers whose consumption is given by their budget constraint (44). This heterogeneity in consumption leads to heterogeneity in labour supply so we have to consider the labour market in more detail in equations (44) to (47) Secondly, the presence of a level of a level of debt derived from the optimising behaviour of …n a n c i a l institutions (49) and (50). Thirdly, the behaviour of the interest rate on this debt (51) to (53), again arising from the optimising behaviour of …n a n c i a l institutions.
B Derivations
B.1 Households B.1.1 Type 1: Credit unconstrained Households solve the problem
subject to
The …r s t -o r d e r conditions are
Linearising the Euler equation gives
The labour supply curve is
where w 1t is the linearised real wage paid to type 1 households
B.1.2 Type 2: Credit constrained
The budget constraint (57) is
where R D t is the average nominal interest rate payable on nominal debt.
Using
At Pt = D t as the credit constraint binds. In the steady state this gives
with zero steady state in ‡ation =0 so
Linearising this
With =0;divide through by C 2
From (69)
Given this level of consumption, constrained households choose their labour supply optimally, and a linearised …r s t -o r d e r condition can be derived as for unconstrained households
B.2 Financial institutions B.2.1 Calvo debt contracts
When deciding the level of a new contract the …n a n c i a l intermediary's problem is
where t;t+i is the stochastic discount factor of the owners of the …n a n c i a l intermediaries (the unconstrained households)
Assuming …n a n c i a l intermediaries raise ‡o a t i n g -r a t e funds from unconstrained households at the central bank's target rate pro…ts are given by:
and t is a cost of deviating from optimum value, assumed to be quadratic
where $ is a constant. The …r s t order condition is
Assuming competition among large numbers of …n a n c i a l intermediaries elimi-nates expected pro…ts over the life of the contract so
which, using the de…nition of pro…ts (79) becomes
so the …r s t -o r d e r condition becomes
so
Noting that in the steady state
and
we can linearise this to give
Note that the stochastic discount factor drops out of the expression in exactly the same way it does in the standard derivation of Calvo pricing as long as steady state in ‡ation is assumed to be zero.
This can then be rewritten as
i.e.
where B (F ) = 1 (1 ) F . To get the expected real value of this contract rearrange (91) to get
and using the de…nition
If in ‡ation follows an autoregressive process
B.2.2 Aggregate Debt
Level The proportion of banks that still have the contract Z t+1 i set at time t i will be the proportion that actually reset in that period, , multiplied by the probability that they haven't reset in the intervening time (1 ) i , so summing over all banks the total nominal debt will be:
Linearising
(note A (1) = ) this can be written as
Rate of change Substituting (95) into (101) gives
This gives the expected rate of change of nominal debt in terms of in ‡ation and the existing value of debt.
B.2.3 Fixed rate loans
If all debt is ‡o a t i n g rate R D = R and r D t = r t . The …x e d rate set at average of expected rates over expected contract duration
Rearranging
So the average interest rate paid by …x e d -r a t e borrowers is r 
If there is some proportion of borrowers in …x e d schemes then
B.2.4 Pro…ts
Both interest earned and dividends paid by …n a n c i a l institutions are dated t + 1 in real terms and are realised at the same time as Y t+1 ; t+1 etc. Taking the budget constraint (57) for j = 2; setting R 2t = R D t ; and, because our assumption of lump-sum taxes mean intermediate …r m s pay no dividends, and since …n a n c i a l institutions are owned by unconstrained households,
Financial institutions real pro…ts are:
where A t is an aggregate of the cost on all existing contracts. Whether these costs are remitted to type 1 or type 2 households or some combination makes no di¤erence to the following derivation, so arbitrarily assuming they are fully remitted to type 2 households and substituting into asset evolution for j = 1 we get
Adding the process for A 2t+1
(1 + t+1 ) (A 1t+1 + A 2t+1 ) = 1 + R
since D t = A 2t and Y t = Y 1t + Y 2t = C 1t + C 2t
which gives A 1t = A 2t for all t if A = D 0 :
B.3 Firms
Firms'cost minimisation is
Write a Lagrangian
(120) …r s t order conditions
So labour incomes are
And pro…ts are:
We can write real marginal cost as 
Linearising (121), (122) and (131) 
So, given our calibration, N 1 = N 2 , and in the steady state
Steady state pro…ts are
By de…nition
and if all pro…ts go to unconstrained
But we also know from the steady state budget constraint
Putting these together
From (135) and ( 
B.3.2 Marginal cost
To solve for the wage of unconstrained households equate labour supply (65) and demand (132) # ( where, from de…nition of ;
In the special case that R = 0, which implies = then
B.4 The Government
The government fully taxes monopoly pro…ts of intermediate …r m s and remits them lump sum to households in proportion to their labour income. Pro…ts and labour income exhaust output so
and from (121), (122) and (125) W 1t N 1t = MC t Y t (160)
De…ne lump sum taxes T 1t = :prof t (163)
Then after-tax factor incomes are
so when linearised y 1t = y 2t = y t (167)
B.5 The process for in ‡ation
If central bank adopts the following rule for output
where, on standard Clarida et al. (1999) assumptions <0. This implies (via the transmission mechanism) a particular rule for the real interest rate
The Phillips curve is t = (1 ) E t t+1 + t 1 + mc t + u t
In the special case discussed in section (3.1) R = 0 and the relation between marginal cost and output is given by (158) 
So is given by 
The error term becomes " t = 1 1 ~ u t (181)
B.6 Time Line
Start of period t 1. Nominal Interest is paid on asset holdings and savings from the previous period R jt 1 (A jt 1 + Y jt 1 C jt 1 )
2. Financial institutions pay nominal dividends relating to spread earnings from last period:
3. This gives nominal assets P t A jt which are predetermined 4. The shock happens 5. In ‡ation, output,consumption, nominal debt in t + 1; the nominal interest rate (dated t; but to be paid in t + 1); real interest receipts 
